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Since 2008, more and more state attorneys general around the 
nation have begun refusing to defend state actions by their respective 
state governments,1 usually on the grounds that a given state law 
violates either the State or Federal Constitution.2 The issue of refusals 
to defend recently came to national prominence when attorneys 
 
 *  © 2018 Wesleigh C. Vick. 
 1. Matt Apuzzo, Holder Sees Way to Curb Bans on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/us/holder-says-state-attorneys-general-dont-
have-to-defend-gay-marriage-bans.html [https://perma.cc/T5R5-6LB]; Niraj Chokshi, Seven 
Attorneys General Won’t Defend Their Own State’s Gay-Marriage Bans, WASH. POST: 
GOVBEAT (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/we/2014/
02/20/six-attorneys-general-wont-defend-their-own-states-gay-marriage-bans [https://perma.cc/
2CMP-JAXA]. 
 2. Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys 
General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2102 (2015). 
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general in Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, California, and 
Illinois refused to defend state bans on same-sex marriage.3 
Additionally, attorneys general have refused to defend laws involving 
immigration, gun control, education, and property rights.4 Despite the 
recent uptick in state attorneys general refusing to defend state laws, 
claims of such a power were virtually unheard of until recently.5 Only 
sixteen instances arose nationwide between 1935 and 2011.6 Whether 
such action is legally permissible has become a significant controversy 
over the past decade.7 
These instances have most often occurred in “purple states,” 
where the predominant political party of the state legislature is the 
opposite of the attorney general’s,8 and where the attorney general 
may be seeking to curry favor with a particular voting base or incite 
 
 3. See Apuzzo, supra note 1 (detailing the particular grounds on which state 
attorneys general refused to defend gay marriage bans enacted by their state legislatures); 
Chokshi, supra note 1 (discussing statements and filings of state attorneys general 
explaining their reasoning for refusing to defend various laws). 
 4. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, app. at 2178–87 (providing individual 
instances in which state attorneys general have refused to defend laws of their own state); 
see also Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, Opinion-Editorial, Can a State’s Attorney 
General Pick and Choose Which Laws to Defend?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0418-devinsprakash-attorneys-general-refusal-to-
defend-20160418-story.html [https://perma.cc/P5FK-UYAB]. 
 5. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 2134 (“Before 2008, state attorneys general 
routinely defended state law and non defense of state law seemed non-politicized.”). 
 6. Id. at 2135. The study used to identify these sixteen instances was not 
comprehensive in the sense that all cases in which an attorney general brought suit to 
challenge the constitutionality of a state law were not tracked down and analyzed. Id. at 
2135 n.140. The criteria for analysis was focused on the attorney general’s duty to defend a 
state law, not to challenge a state law. Id. Furthermore, not every decision to forego an 
appeal of an adverse judgment was considered. Id. at 2136 n.141. 
 7. See, e.g., Holder Gives Nod to State AGs to Drop Defense of Gay Marriage Bans 
Amid Court Challenges, FOX NEWS: POL. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2014/02/25/holder-gives-nod-to-state-ags-to-drop-defense-gay-marriage-bans-amid-
court.html [https://perma.cc/894C-GC4D] (providing one example of how hotly contested 
the duty to defend may be). Federal Attorney General Eric Holder reportedly said that 
attorneys general should closely scrutinize state laws when deciding whether to defend 
them against a constitutional challenge. Id. Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange 
responded:  
A state attorney general has a solemn duty to the state and its people to defend 
state laws and constitutional provisions against challenge under federal law. To 
refuse to do so because of personal policy preferences or political pressure erodes 
the rule of law on which all of our freedoms are founded.  
Id. 
 8. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 2106. 
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political opponents.9 Scholars suggest that this temptation to appeal 
to certain electoral coalitions will likely lead to continued instances of 
state attorneys general refusing to defend state laws.10 Though 
increasingly common, most attorneys general who have refused to 
defend a state law cannot point to an express source of power 
granting them the ability to do so.11 In fact, most state constitutions 
and statutes—the sources of an attorney general’s powers and 
duties—do not directly mention a duty to defend (or not defend), 
which leaves the analysis in most states up to structural inference and 
scarce case law.12 
This trend has loomed especially large in North Carolina over 
the past four years. In 2013, the federal government instituted a 
lawsuit against the State regarding its recently passed voter ID law.13 
Then-Attorney General Roy Cooper vocally opposed the law as 
“[o]ne of the worst election pieces of legislation in the country”14 and 
wrote a personal letter to then-Governor Pat McCrory urging the bill 
be vetoed.15 Despite his personal objections, Cooper condemned the 
State’s choice to hire outside counsel as “a waste of money,” insisting 
 
 9. See id. at 2104 (suggesting that attorneys general with political aspirations for 
higher office may feel pressure to “endear [themselves] to an electoral block by refusing to 
defend a reviled state statute”). 
 10. See id. at 2106–07. 
 11. See Will Doran, N.C. Sen. Phil Berger Says A.G. Roy Cooper is Failing His Duties 
by Not Defending HB2 Lawsuit, POLITIFACT (Apr. 7, 2016, 6:53 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/north-carolina/statements/2016/apr/07/phil-berger/nc-sen-phil-
berger-says-g-roy-cooper-failing-his-d/ [https://perma.cc/3VYV-Y5GZ]. Doran notes that 
the Attorney General of North Carolina’s duties have been “pieced together over the 
years by common law, court rulings, and state statutes,” and that varying scholarly 
opinions have interpreted these sources differently. Id. 
 12. Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 2103; see also id. app. at 2157–77 (listing the 
constitutional and statutory sources of authority that all fifty state attorneys general draw 
on for their powers and noting that most do not discuss a duty to defend). 
 13. David Ingram & Aruna Viswanatha, Government Sues to Block North Carolina 
Voter Law, REUTERS: POL. (Sept. 30, 2013, 4:59 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-justice-voting-rights/government-sues-to-block-north-carolina-voter-law-idUSBRE98
T13620130930 [https://perma.cc/X6K8-SPAA]. 
 14. Joel Brown, Cooper, McCrory Disagree About Defending Lawsuit Over Voter ID, 
ABC11 (Oct. 1, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://abc11.com/archive/9269692/ [https://perma.cc/
DSZ3-LZT5]. 
 15. Letter from Roy Cooper, Attorney Gen., State of N.C., to Pat McCrory, 
Governor, State of N.C. (July 26, 2013), http://ftpcontent4.worldnow.com/wect/
PDFs%20for%20stories/voting%20restrictions%20letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ26-PNK8]. 
Cooper noted in his letter: “I am expressing .	.	. my public policy objections and not legal 
opinions.” Id. 
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that his personal grievances with the voter ID law would not prevent 
him from defending it in court.16 
Cooper took the opposite approach just barely a year later when 
he openly refused to defend North Carolina’s infamous House Bill 2 
(“HB2”), which provided that only biological gender, and not gender 
identity, could determine which bathroom a person could use at state-
run facilities.17 When the bill was passed, the ACLU, Equality NC, 
and several transgender individuals, among others, filed suit.18 This 
time, however, Cooper stated that he would not defend the state law 
in the pending litigation because it was a discriminatory “national 
embarrassment” and because he and his office believed the law to be 
unconstitutional.19 At the time, Cooper was the Democratic candidate 
for Governor, so his actions created political tension with the state’s 
Republican leadership.20 Tension surrounding the issue continued to 
mount between Cooper, McCrory, and the Republican leadership in 
the state until early 2017 when Cooper became Governor and the 
General Assembly partially repealed HB2.21 The repeal of HB2 
without a challenge to Cooper’s action leaves essentially unanswered 
the question of whether the Attorney General of North Carolina can 
refuse to defend state laws. 
This Comment attempts to answer that question. It examines a 
wide range of authorities on the scope of an attorney general’s power 
from medieval times to the present and ultimately argues that the 
Attorney General of North Carolina does not possess the power to 
 
 16. Brown, supra note 14. Cooper insisted the Attorney General’s office was more 
than capable of defending the voter ID law in court because “[t]here are laws that I have 
disagreed with personally that our staff have defended successfully.” Id. 
 17. See Doran, supra note 11. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Amber Phillips, Is It Legal for North Carolina’s Attorney General to Not Defend 




 20. Id. In criticizing Roy Cooper’s refusal to defend HB2, incumbent Governor Pat 
McCrory insisted that “[a]s the state’s attorney, he can’t select which laws he will defend 
and which laws are politically expedient to refuse to defend.” Id. Likewise, Senate Pro 
Tempore Phil Berger remarked, “Attorney General Roy Cooper refuses to do his job and 
defend us .	.	.	. This isn’t the first time Cooper has pandered to far left special interests 
instead of fulfilling his oath to defend the people of North Carolina.” Doran, supra note 
11. 
 21. See, e.g., Jason Hanna, Madison Park & Eliott C. McLaughlin, North Carolina 
Repeals ‘Bathroom Bill’, CNN: POL. (Mar. 30, 2017, 9:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/03/30/politics/north-carolina-hb2-agreement/index.html [https://perma.cc/2LNJ-ESF9] 
(stating that the repeal of HB2 was a “compromise” after “contentious debate”). 
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refuse to defend state laws, even when she personally believes some 
higher law supersedes the one in question. 
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the historical 
development of the role of attorneys general, both broadly and in 
North Carolina. Part II lays out the sources of the law that currently 
give the Attorney General of North Carolina authority. Part III 
identifies statutory and common law arguments used to support a 
right not to defend and explains how the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s 2000 decision in Bailey v. State22 refutes these arguments. 
Lastly, Part IV discusses other sources of relevant law, including the 
role of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct in guiding 
the attorney-client-like relationship between the Attorney General 
and the State. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The office and nomenclature of “Attorney General” existed as 
far back as the Middle Ages, first appearing around 1278.23 At this 
time, multiple “serjeants” and solicitors shared the duties of the 
modern attorneys general.24 
A “King’s attorney” also came into existence in the latter part of 
the fifteenth century, and it was this position that developed into the 
modern iteration of the American attorney general.25 By the end of 
the seventeenth century, the attorney general “ceased to be a royal 
agent and became an advisor to the government as a whole or 
attorney for the crown.”26 In doing so, “[h]e appeared on behalf of the 
Crown in the courts, gave legal advice to all departments of state and 
appeared for them if they wished to take action in the courts.”27 
“Counterparts” to this office were found in the English colonies 
in America, each possessing the common law powers of the English 
Attorney General.28 In order to ensure his interests were efficiently 
 
 22. 353 N.C. 142, 540 S.E.2d 313 (2000). 
 23. Robert Morgan, The Office of the Attorney General, 2 N.C. CENT. L.J. 165, 165 
(1970). 
 24. Rita W. Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney 
General in England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304, 305–06 (1958). 
 25. Id. at 306. 
 26. Id. at 307. 
 27. Id.; see also Tice v. Dep’t of Transp., 67 N.C. App. 48, 52, 312 S.E.2d 241, 243 
(1984) (“As the office evolved in England, the Attorney General became the Chief Legal 
Advisor for the Crown and had charge of management of all legal affairs and the 
prosecution of all suits in which the Crown was interested.” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)). 
 28. Cooley, supra note 24, at 309; see also Oliver W. Hammonds, The Attorney 
General in the American Colonies, in 1 Anglo-American Legal History Series, No. 2, at 3 
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served, the King was directly involved in appointing the attorney 
general of each colony.29 In North Carolina specifically, the first 
confirmed Attorney General was Nicholas Trott, appointed by the 
King in 1697 as part of an attempt to regain monarchal control over 
the proprietary colonies.30 
After the American Revolution, every state constitution, except 
for Connecticut’s, provided for a state attorney general,31 though 
none specifically outlined the duties of the office.32 Rather, the 
powers attorneys general exercised in the newly independent states 
“stemmed from the common law, colonial custom, and legislative 
act.”33 Article XIII of the first North Carolina Constitution, ratified 
on December 18, 1776, provided “[t]hat the General Assembly shall 
.	.	. appoint .	.	. [the] Attorney-General, who shall be commissioned by 
the Governor, and hold .	.	. offices during good behavior.”34 The 
drafters of this constitution envisioned the Attorney General as an 
officer of the courts.35 The position was separate from the executive 
branch entirely, which is illustrative of the “[p]rofound distrust of .	.	. 
executive power [that] is evident throughout” the first North Carolina 
Constitution.36 It was not until the North Carolina Constitution of 
1868 that the State Attorney General became a publicly elected 
member of the executive branch, whose duties were to be “prescribed 
by law.”37 Constitutional reference to the Attorney General has 
 
(Paul M. Hamlin ed., 1939). There was no need for the crown or colonial leaders to 
enumerate the specific powers of the colonial attorneys general because they were 
essentially thirteen delegates of their analogue in England. Id. 
 29. Cooley, supra note 24, at 310–11. 
 30. See Hammonds, supra note 28, at 11. Trott was Attorney General for “the whole 
of Carolina,” including what is today both North and South Carolina. Id. The two colonies 
were not completely separate until at least the 1710s. Robert J. Cain, Separation of 
Carolinas, NCPEDIA (2006), https://www.ncpedia.org/carolinas-separation [https://perma.cc/
4L4L-KZA7]. 
 31. Cooley, supra note 24, at 311. 
 32. Id. at 312. 
 33. Id. 
 34. N.C. CONST. of 1776, §	13. 
 35. JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONSTITUTION 6 n.20 (2d ed. 2013) (“The attorney general enjoyed the same tenure as 
the judges, apparently on the theory that he was an officer of the court.”). 
 36. John L. Sanders, Our Constitutions: An Historical Perspective, reprinted in 
ELAINE F. MARSHALL, N.C. DEP’T OF SEC’Y OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 
2007–2008, at 85. Shortly after statehood, in keeping with this distrust of executive power, 
the General Assembly began to directly appoint the Attorney General’s deputies and limit 
the scope of his jurisdiction. Morgan, supra note 23, at 176. By 1806, the Attorney General 
was allowed to prosecute only within one of six state jurisdictions. Id. 
 37. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, §§	1, 13. 
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remained essentially the same since then.38 Pursuant to the 1868 
constitution’s grant of power, the North Carolina General Assembly 
prescribed the Attorney General’s powers and duties that same 
year.39 Section 114-2 of the General Statutes of North Carolina lists 
eight duties of the Attorney General and has remained much the 
same since its initial codification in 1868.40 However, like most state 
attorneys general, the Attorney General of North Carolina was seen 
as continuing to possess the common law powers held by colonial and 
English Attorneys General,41 a practice formally recognized by the 
General Assembly in 1985.42 This history helps inform the bounds of 
the modern Attorney General of North Carolina’s authority, which is 
explored in greater detail in the next section. 
 
 38. Compare id. (describing an elected Attorney General in the “Executive 
Department” whose duties “shall be prescribed by law”), with N.C. CONST. art. III, §	7(1)–
(2) (calling for “an Attorney General,” to be among one of the “other elective officers,” 
whose “respective duties shall be prescribed by law”). Although the North Carolina 
Constitution was significantly redrafted in 1971, the language creating the Attorney 
General of North Carolina remained largely the same. See N.C. CONST. art. III, §	7(1)–(2); 
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III., §§	1, 13. 
 39. Act of Apr. 12, 1869, ch. 270, §	82, 1868 N.C. Sess. Laws 615, 633–34 (codified at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-2 (2017)). 
 40. The original eight duties may be summarized as follows: (1) To defend all actions 
in which the State has an interest or is a party; (2) To defend and prosecute, at the request 
of other government officials, all suits relating to matters connected to the officials’ 
department; (3) To consult with and advise the Solicitors; (4) To make and submit annual 
reports to the General Assembly; (5) To include an abstract of the reports pertaining to 
the Solicitors within the annual report; (6) To give an opinion on all questions of law 
asked by the General Assembly or other select branches; (7) To pay all moneys to the 
State; and (8) To keep proper books. Id. The current statute is quite similar, though it 
provides for ten specific duties of the Attorney General of North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §	114-2 (2017). 
 41. See Rufus L. Edmisten, The Common Law Powers of the Attorney General of 
North Carolina, 9 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1977) (“Since 1715, the North Carolina General 
Assembly has provided that the common law remains in full force and effect in North 
Carolina except as it may be inconsistent with our form of government or modified, 
repealed, or otherwise affected by constitutional or statutory enactment.”); Hammonds, 
supra note 28, at 12 (“[T]he attorney general in North Carolina exercised ‘all the powers 
authority and trusts that the Attorney and Solicitor General of England have in that 
kingdom.’” (quoting William Tryon, A View of the Polity of the Province of North 
Carolina in the Year 1767, in 7 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 472, 486 
(William L. Saunders ed., 1890))).  
 42. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-1.1 (2017). (“The General Assembly reaffirms that the 
Attorney General has had and continues to be vested with those powers of the Attorney 
General that existed at the common law, that are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the 
Constitution or laws of North Carolina.”). 
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II.  THE SOURCES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S AUTHORITY 
Like all other forty-nine state attorneys general, the Attorney 
General of North Carolina is a creature of state law, created by the 
state constitution with duties “prescribed by law.”43 The Federal 
Constitution does assume state governments each include a 
legislative, executive, and judicial branch, but beyond that general 
structure and a minimal requirement of a republican form of 
government, the Constitution is silent as to a duty or power to decline 
to defend a state’s actions.44 So while federal law is by no means 
irrelevant to how state attorneys general operate,45 for purposes of 
determining the Attorney General of North Carolina’s duty to defend 
state laws and actions, it adds little—if anything—to the analysis.46 
Similarly, each state attorney general is a creature of her own state’s 
law, meaning the powers and duties of all fifty state attorneys general 
are unique.47 Thus, broad “categorical statements about whether state 
attorneys general must (or must not) defend .	.	. are usually little more 
than self-serving sound bites from elected, politically ambitious 
attorneys general” that “evince a lamentable indifference to the 
power of states to craft an office that suits their particular needs.”48 
As noted above, many of the duties of attorneys general have 
their origin in a historical tradition stretching back to medieval times. 
In North Carolina, these historical common law duties have been 
 
 43. N.C. CONST. art. III, §	7(1)–(2). 
 44. Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 2116. 
 45. See id. at 2105, 2108–10. Devins and Prakash believe federal law is relevant to the 
extent that states cannot discriminate between federal and state law when it comes to a 
duty to defend. Id. at 2015. For instance, if a state expressly requires an attorney general to 
refuse to defend state laws for a given reason, then the attorney general is duty bound to 
refuse to defend a federal law for that same reason. Id. Further, they note that neither the 
Federal Constitution nor any federal statute require or grant any state attorney general 
the power to refuse to defend state laws. Id. at 2107–10.	 
 46. See id. at 2107–08 (“[N]either the Constitution nor federal statutes empower or 
oblige attorneys general to concede the invalidity of a challenged state law.”). 
 47. Id. at 2100. 
 48. Id. In 2014, both Federal Attorney General Eric Holder and Wisconsin Attorney 
General J. B. Van Hollen made sweeping statements about whether state attorneys 
general could refuse to defend state same-sex marriage bans. See Apuzzo, supra note 1. 
Holder asserted that “state attorneys general are not obligated to defend laws they believe 
are discriminatory,” while Van Hollen responded that state attorneys general “are the 
ultimate defenders of our state constitutions.” Id. As noted, such overarching analyses 
ignore the fact that state attorneys general are subject to their own state constitutions and 
laws and, therefore, have differing duties and powers. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, 
at 2100. Devins and Prakash note that these two men “suppose that there is a one-size-fits 
all answer to the question whether attorneys general may concede the invalidity of state 
statutes and constitutions.” Id. at 2122. They insist instead that “[w]hile attorneys general 
all share the same title, they can and do have different powers and duties.” Id. 
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affirmed by the General Assembly in part and modified by statute in 
part. This section details the various common law duties of the 
Attorney General of North Carolina and describes how these 
common law duties were modified by statute. 
A. The Attorney General’s Common Law Powers 
The North Carolina General Assembly has recognized on more 
than one occasion that the common law of England is in effect in 
North Carolina, both generally and with regard to the powers of the 
Attorney General.49 The exact scope of the common law governing 
state attorneys general is unclear. But the common law remains a vital 
source of power for attorneys general to draw upon.50 Though the 
scope of the powers of attorneys general varies from state to state, 
former Attorney General of North Carolina Rufus Edmisten asserts 
that “as primary legal officer of the state,” the Attorney General has 
“consistently been viewed .	.	. as possessing the power to initiate, 
conduct and maintain any suits necessary for enforcement of the laws 
of the state, preservation of order, and protection of public rights.”51 
Edmisten posits that such a broad grant of authority permits the 
Attorney General of North Carolina an affirmative power to “control 
litigation”52 by bringing suits against state officials, “to protect the 
integrity of state laws,”53 to intervene in suits concerning issues like 
 
 49. In 1715, the General Assembly first confirmed that the common law of England 
was in force in North Carolina. Act of 1715, ch. 31, §	VI, 1715 N.C. Sess. Laws 13, 14. 
Similarly, section	4-1 of the General Statutes of North Carolina now provides: “All such 
parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use [and are] not destructive of 
or repugnant to, or inconsistent with the freedom and independence of this State .	.	. [a]re 
hereby declared to be in full force within this State.” N.C. GEN. STAT. §	4-1 (2017). In 
1985, the General Assembly enacted section	 114-1.1 of the General Statutes of North 
Carolina, which provides: “The General Assembly reaffirms that the attorney general has 
and continues to be vested with those powers of the Attorney General that existed at the 
common law, that are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of 
North Carolina.” Id. §	114-1.1. 
 50. John Ben Shepperd, Common Law Powers and Duties of the Attorney General, 7 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 1 (1955) (“[I]ncidents of the office [of the attorney general] were so 
numerous and varied as to discourage the framers of the state constitutions and legislature 
from setting them out in complete detail, thus permitting [attorneys general] to look to 
common law to fill in the gaps.”). 
 51. See Edmisten, supra note 41, at 10; Lacy H. Thornburg, Changes in the State’s Law 
Firm: The Powers, Duties and Operations of the Office of the Attorney General, 12 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 343, 348–49 (1990) (“[T]he common law is the fountainhead of the 
Attorney General’s authority to represent, defend, and enforce the legal interests of State 
government and the citizens of our state.”). 
 52. See Edmisten, supra note 41, at 18. 
 53. Id. at 13. 
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utilities rates,54 and even to challenge the constitutionality of state 
statutes.55 Under this view, the Attorney General essentially has the 
ability to act or bring suit whenever he thinks such action is in “the 
public interest.”56 
This ability to act in “the public interest” is certainly an 
expansive grant of power. In North Carolina and beyond, it has 
allowed several state attorneys general to bring nationally influential 
litigation in a wide variety of areas, including consumer protection, 
antitrust enforcement, environmental regulation, and securities 
regulation.57 In fact, a former Attorney General of North Carolina 
attempted to use this broad authority to intervene in opposition to the 
State in ongoing litigation.58 Using a similar argument, John Harris 
claims that “representing the public interest” is a major source of 
power supporting the Attorney General’s ability to refuse to defend 
state laws, at least when they are unconstitutional.59 Broad though the 
common law powers of the Attorney General may be, the exact 
extent of these powers is unclear, and others disagree with Edmisten 
and Harris, arguing that the replacement of the monarch by “the 
people as represented by their governments” implies a common law 
duty to represent the State and its agencies.60 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 14 n.74. An early example of such a constitutional challenge is State ex rel. 
Attorney-General v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 85 S.E. 418 (1915). There, the Attorney General 
challenged the constitutionality of a statute permitting the Governor to appoint women as 
well as men as notaries public. Id. at 334, 85 S.E. at 419. 
 56. See State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 330, 230 S.E.2d 651, 653 
(1976) (allowing Attorney General’s intervention “on behalf of the using and consuming 
public” in utilities rate making adjustment); State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Scott, 182 
N.C. 866, 869, 109 S.E. 789, 792 (1921) (describing Attorney General’s suit against the 
State Board of Accountancy for ultra vires actions as “in the interest of the public”); 
Edmisten, supra note 41, at 13. 
 57. Timothy Meyer, Comment, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys 
General, Regulatory Litigation, and the New Federalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 886 
(2007). 
 58. See Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 151–52, 540 S.E.2d 313, 319 (2000) (refuting an 
attempt by the Attorney General of North Carolina to challenge trial court’s award of the 
State’s attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs in a class action). 
 59. John E. Harris, Comment, Holes in the Defense: Evaluating the North Carolina 
Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and the Responses of Other Government Actors, 92 
N.C. L. REV. 2027, 2036 (2014). Harris asserts that the Attorney General may be able to 
refuse to defend a state law when he subjectively deems it unconstitutional because 
defending an unconstitutional law might violate “(1) the common law duty to represent 
the public interest; and (2) the Attorney General’s constitutional oath of office.” Id. at 
2039; see also id. at 2039–45 (elaborating on this argument). 
 60. E.g., Morgan, supra note 23, at 167 (“[T]he logical conclusion in interpreting the 
common law was that the Attorney General had the duty and the exclusive right to 
represent these governments and their agencies and officers. Beginning in the 19th 
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B. The Attorney General’s Statutory Powers 
The effectiveness of the Attorney General’s common law 
authority as described by Edmisten and Harris is complicated by 
section 114-1.1 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, enacted in 
1985.61 That law explicitly provides that though the Attorney General 
continues to possess his common law powers, his statutory duties get 
preferential treatment if and when they conflict with common law 
powers.62 As noted above, section 114-2 also includes eight 
subsections outlining the enumerated powers and duties of the 
Attorney General.63 Two of these subsections are significant in 
analyzing a duty to defend. Subsections 1 and 2 state that it shall be 
the duty of the Attorney General: 
(1) To defend all actions in the appellate division in which the 
State shall be interested, or a party, and to appear for the State 
in any other court or tribunal in any cause or matter, civil or 
criminal, in which the State may be a party or interested. 
(2) To represent all State departments, agencies, institutions, 
commissions, bureaus or other organized activities of the State 
which receive support in whole or in part from the State. Where 
the Attorney General represents a State department, agency, 
institution, commission, bureau, or other organized activity of 
the State which receives support in whole or in part from the 
State, the Attorney General shall act in conformance with Rule 
1.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the North Carolina 
State Bar.64 
These provisions, along with two others,65 appear to limit the 
supposed common law ability to act in the public interest against the 
 
Century, a trend developed in a number of states to diminish the Attorney General’s 
common law power to exclusively represent the State agencies.”). 
 61. See Act of June 28, 1985, ch. 479, §	137, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 488 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §	114-1.1 (2017)). 
 62. The statute provides: “The General Assembly reaffirms that the Attorney 
General has had and continues to be vested with those powers of the Attorney General 
that existed at the common law, that are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the 
Constitution or laws of North Carolina.” N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-1.1 (2017). 
 63. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 64. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-2(1)–(2) (2017). 
 65. Section 147-17 of the General Statutes of North Carolina reads in part: 
(a) No department, officer, agency, institution, commission, bureau or other 
organized activity of the State which receives support in whole or in part from the 
State shall employ private counsel, except with the approval of the Governor. The 
Governor shall give his approval only if the Attorney General has advised him, as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section, that it is impracticable for the Attorney 
General to render legal services .	.	.	. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1855 (2018) 
1866 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
State by specifically creating a duty to represent the State in just 
about every situation. This broad language encompasses most 
imaginable scenarios in which the Attorney General might wish to 
refuse to defend the State and does not imply any grant of discretion 
to the Attorney General for the circumstances under which this duty 
arises.66 
Conversely, subsection 8(a) could appear to expressly provide 
for the Attorney General’s ability to refuse to defend. It allows the 
Attorney General to 
 
(b) The Attorney General shall be counsel for all departments, officers, agencies, 
institutions, commissions, bureaus, or other organized activities of the State which 
receives support in whole or in part from the State. Whenever the Attorney 
General shall advise the Governor that it is impracticable for him to render legal 
services to any State agency, institution, commission, bureau or other organized 
activity, or to defend a State employee or former employee as authorized by 
Article 31A of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes [which details specific tort 
instances committed by state employees the Attorney General may refuse to 
defend], the Governor may authorize the employment of private counsel .	.	.	. 
See id. §	147-17(a)–(b). While this provision does not provide that the Attorney General 
may never refuse to defend the State or its sub-entities, it does imply that refusals should 
occur under very narrow circumstances. The structure of subsection (a) suggests that the 
Attorney General is expected to represent an agency or other state entity because it 
establishes a default standard, id. §	147-17(a) (“No department .	.	. shall employ outside 
counsel.”), followed by an exception. Had this provision been drafted using more 
permissive language, such as “An agency, etc. may hire private counsel when .	.	.	,” then it 
would be clearer that the General Assembly intended the Attorney General’s duty to 
represent the State to be more flexible. Similarly, subsection (b) first provides a default 
rule that the Attorney General shall be counsel for the State and its entities. Id. §	147-
17(b). It then provides two separate exceptions for the duty to be counsel to the State: one 
for when the Attorney General finds it “impracticable to render legal services” and one 
for when he finds it impracticable “to defend a State employee.” Id. Again, this language 
clearly does not prohibit the Attorney General from refusing to defend the State, but the 
structure of this provision, along with the express duty to defend the State as laid out in 
section	114-2, insinuates that the General Assembly intended refusals to defend the State 
to be, at minimum, uncommon. Former Attorney General of North Carolina Lacy 
Thornburg notes that even though many state agencies now employ “a legal advisor or in-
house counsel .	.	. [t]hese attorneys cannot represent their officials or agencies in legal 
proceedings.” Thornburg, supra note 51, at 358. The Attorney General plays the “major 
role” in providing legal representation for state agencies. Id. at 359. 
 66. Compare LA. STAT. ANN. §	49:257(C) (West, Westlaw through 2018 First 
Extraordinary Sess.) (stating ambiguously “the attorney general, at his discretion, shall 
represent or supervise the representation of the interests of the state in any action or 
proceeding in which the constitutionality of a state statute or of a resolution of the 
legislature is challenged or assailed”), with N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-2(1)–(2) (2017) 
(requiring the Attorney General to “defend all actions” where the State or its sub-entities 
are a party to and “represent” the state and its sub-entities). The phrase “at his discretion” 
in the Louisiana statute provides less clarity than the parallel North Carolina statute as to 
whether or not the Louisiana Attorney General may refuse to defend a state law since he 
may choose when to represent the State. 
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intervene, when he deems it to be advisable in the public interest, 
in proceedings before any courts, regulatory officers, agencies 
and bodies, both State and federal, in a representative capacity 
for and on behalf of the using and consuming public of this 
State. He shall also have the authority to institute and originate 
proceedings before such courts, officers, agencies or bodies and 
shall have authority to appear before agencies on behalf of the 
State and its agencies and citizens in all matters affecting the 
public interest.67 
This provision reads like a specific codification of the common law 
power to act in the public interest, which could be read to weigh in 
favor of the ability to refuse to defend.68 Though it does not 
specifically discuss refusing to defend state laws, it does include the 
affirmative ability to intervene and initiate suits on behalf of the 
public. This language appears to imply a duty to the public that is on 
equal footing with the duty to defend and represent the State, 
although the Supreme Court of North Carolina has construed this 
provision otherwise.69 There are several other statutory duties of the 
Attorney General scattered across the General Statutes,70 but 
sections 114-1.1 and 114-2 are the most relevant for analyzing the 
duty to defend. 
III.  BAILEY AS REJOINDER TO ARGUMENTS FOR A RIGHT NOT TO 
DEFEND 
With the common law and statutory framework described above, 
two North Carolina commentators—Edmisten and Harris—have 
made strong arguments that the common law provides, at least by 
implication, if not more, the Attorney General’s ability to refuse to 
defend. This section reviews those arguments and suggests a potential 
statutory argument for the right not to defend. It then uses Bailey v. 
State as a framework for refuting both the common law and statutory 
arguments for a right not to defend. 
 
 67. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-2(8)(a) (2017) (emphasis added).  
 68. See Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 153, 540 S.E.2d 313, 320 (2000) (analyzing 
section	 114-2(8)(a) to determine if it supported a broad power to “defend the public 
interest”).  
 69. See infra Part III.A. 
 70. See Thornburg, supra note 51, at 357 (noting that since the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Attorney General of North Carolina’s statutory responsibilities have expanded to include 
“such diverse tasks as antitrust enforcement and consumer protection, utilities ratemaking 
intervention, Medicaid fraud detection and prosecution, and increased statewide 
investigatory authority”).  
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In Bailey, the Attorney General of North Carolina attempted to 
intervene in a class action appeal, complaining that the attorneys’ fees 
granted to the plaintiff by the trial court in the case were excessive.71 
The Attorney General argued that he had standing to intervene 
because setting a standard for such high attorneys’ fees was against 
the public interest.72 The Attorney General relied upon both the 
broad common law right to act in the public interest and the statutory 
reference to the power to intervene on behalf of the public interest.73 
While this was not a direct attempt to refuse to defend a state law, it 
allowed the court to define the breadth of the Attorney General’s 
powers in this area. The court declined to let the Attorney General 
intervene in the case, rejecting both the common law and statutory 
arguments he made.74 
A. Bailey’s Response to Common Law Arguments for a Right Not to 
Defend 
John Harris argues that the Attorney General retains the right to 
refuse to defend state laws despite section 114-1.1, at least in regard 
to challenging a law that is unconstitutional.75 Harris imagines the 
clear and affirmative duty to defend state laws as existing on a sliding 
scale in relationship with the Attorney General’s duty to uphold the 
United States Constitution.76 He notes that “[a]t one end there is no 
conflict between competing duties, and the power to decline defense 
is non-existent. At the other end, there is clear conflict between 
competing duties, and declining defense is very likely within his or her 
legal authority.”77 Harris substantiates his argument by noting the 
General Assembly reaffirmed the existence of all the Attorney 
General’s common law powers by statute,78 but he fails to note that 
section 114-1.1 only grants use of the common law powers to the 
extent they do not conflict with statutory duties—an oversight that 
undercuts his argument. 
 
 
 71. Bailey, 353 N.C. at 152, 540 S.E.2d at 320. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 151–54, 540 S.E.2d at 320–21. 
 74. Id. at 152–53, 540 S.E.2d at 320. 
 75. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Harris, supra note 59, at 2038 (comparing the Attorney General’s duty to 
defend to the sliding scale of presidential authority crafted by Justice Jackson in his 
famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)). 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 2039–40. 
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Harris further infers the ability to refuse to defend from the 
common law power to act in the public interest from the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina’s 1915 decision in State ex rel. Attorney-
General v. Knight.79 Harris points out that in that case the court did 
not question that the Attorney General had standing to bring suit 
challenging the constitutionality of a state law allowing women to 
serve as notaries public.80 Harris interprets the court’s choice not to 
discuss the Attorney General’s standing as acceptance of the 
Attorney General’s ability to challenge state laws in the name of 
acting in the public interest.81 Further, Harris suggests that if the 
Attorney General is able to act against the State by invoking the 
public interest, then it follows that she can, in the same vein, choose 
not to act.82 According to Harris, “if the Attorney General has the 
ability under the common law powers to challenge the 
constitutionality of a state statute outright, declining to defend—a 
seemingly ‘lesser’ offense—would appear to fall within the 
parameters of his or her powers.”83 This argument is tenuous at best 
in that it first infers one power from judicial silence and then implies 
another power from that first inference.84 While his deductions are 
not illogical, they lack clear legal support—judicial or otherwise. But 
even if Harris’s argument regarding the common law right not to 
 
 79. See id. at 2041–42 (discussing State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Knight, 169 N.C. 
333, 85 S.E. 418 (1915)). 
 80. Harris notes that in Knight, the court “explicitly acknowledged that the Attorney 
General brought the action as a plaintiff, exercised appellate rights, and .	.	. ‘insisted that 
the act of the General Assembly [in question] was invalid’” but did not “consider it 
necessary to cite any authority for the Attorney General to bring such an action, and 
neither the majority opinion nor the dissent discusses the authority of the Attorney 
General to challenge the constitutionality of state laws.” Id. at 2041–42 (second alteration 
in original) (quoting State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 340–41, 85 
S.E. 418, 422 (1915)). Harris interprets the court’s silence on the issue as acceptance that 
the Attorney General had standing in the matter. Id. at 2041. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 2042. 
 83. Id. (emphasis in original). Harris assumes that the court’s recognition of the 
Attorney General’s ability to affirmatively take action in the public interest implies the 
ability to choose not to take action without providing any sort of reasoning for that 
implication. See id. While his implication may be true, providing reasoning for it seems 
necessary. 
 84. Further, Harris supposes that if the Attorney General can actively challenge a 
state statute, then he should be able to passively refuse to defend that same statute, a right 
he deems a “lesser offense.” Id. He seems to categorize a refusal to defend a state law as a 
“lesser offense” based on the fact that it is passive as compared to the action required to 
challenge a state law. However, he provides no support for the assumption that a refusal 
to defend is actually a “lesser offense” than an active challenge. 
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defend was less attenuated, section 114-1.1 subjugates all common law 
powers below the duty to represent and defend the State. 
In reading all that he does into Knight, Harris ignores the much 
more recent Bailey case that addresses the issue more directly. In 
Bailey, the court affirmatively interprets the breadth of the Attorney 
General’s common law powers much more stringently than Harris 
believes it did in 1915. The court held the Attorney General did not 
have standing under his common law power to act in the public 
interest because 
the Attorney General cites to no source—case or statute—
which suggests that his common law power to defend the public 
interest as an entity separate from the State extends to 
circumstances analogous to the facts of this case. While this 
Court held in Martin v. Thornburg that the Attorney General 
had a duty to prosecute all actions necessary to defend “the 
property and revenue” of the people, it did not recognize a 
distinction between either the “people” and the “State,” or 
their respective interests in that case. Moreover, no language 
within the Martin holding can be construed as to imply that the 
Attorney General may act to defend the “people’s” interest at 
the expense of the State’s interest.85 
Unlike the Knight court in 1915, which took for granted the 
power of the Attorney General to challenge the constitutionality of 
state laws, the Bailey court highlighted the inability of the Attorney 
General to point to any specific case or statute suggesting that 
intervening in class action suits was within the purview of acting in the 
 
 85. Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 152, 540 S.E.2d 313, 320 (2000) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Martin v. Thornburg, 320 N.C. 533, 546, 359 S.E.2d 472, 479 
(1987)). The court in Martin v. Thornburg, 320 N.C. 533, 359 S.E.2d 472 (1987), was faced 
with the question of whether the duty of the Attorney General as prescribed in section 
114-2(1) of the General Statutes of North Carolina—a duty to appear for the State in any 
proceeding in which the State may be a party—violated article III, section 1 of the North 
Carolina Constitution. Id. at 545, 359 S.E.2d. at 479. The court determined that because 
the common law duties of the English Attorney General included the “duty to prosecute 
all actions necessary for the protection and defense of the property and revenue of the 
Crown,” that same duty applied to the Attorney General of North Carolina regarding the 
“defense of property and revenue of the sovereign people of North Carolina.” Id. at 546, 
359 S.E.2d at 479. However, as noted by the Bailey court, the Martin court did not 
distinguish between the duty to defend the “sovereign people” and the State. Bailey, 353 
N.C. at 152, 540 S.E.2d at 320. In fact, the Martin court, after determining that it was 
within the purview of the Attorney General of North Carolina’s duties to defend the 
sovereign people, held that this duty included the duty to defend suits brought against the 
State, its agencies, or its officers. Martin, 320 N.C. at 546, 359 S.E.2d at 479.  
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public interest.86 While the Bailey court does not specifically address 
the issue of an attorney general refusing to defend a state law, its 
approach suggests that when evaluating the legality of an attorney 
general’s actions, a North Carolina court would require an attorney 
general to point to a case or statute supporting his or her ability to 
refuse to defend. But since the Supreme Court of North Carolina has 
clearly held it does not recognize a divergence between the statutory 
phrase “in the public interest” and the interests of the State, it is 
doubtful whether it would respond positively to an attorney general’s 
attempt to refuse to defend a state law in the name of acting in the 
public interest. Because the Supreme Court of North Carolina does 
not currently recognize a distinction between the public interest and 
the State’s interest, a refusal to defend a state law or action might 
actually be a refusal to defend the public interest as well. 
Harris’s interpretation of the common law power to act in the 
public interest seems to run contrary to the judicial interpretation of 
that power. Case law on this common law power is sparse, and case 
law regarding the Attorney General’s ability to refuse to defend is 
nonexistent. But the precedent that does exist construes the common 
law powers of the Attorney General very narrowly and conveys the 
sense that acting in the public interest is not a power separate from 
the duty to represent the State. Therefore, it does not support an 
argument for the Attorney General of North Carolina’s ability to 
refuse to defend state law. 
Edmisten made similar arguments to Harris’s while more fully 
exploring all the facets of the Attorney General’s duty to act in the 
public interest. However, since his article was published seven years 
before the General Assembly enacted section 114-1.1—the statute 
that subjugates the common law powers of the Attorney General 
below higher statutory duties—it is largely irrelevant for 
understanding the duty to defend in the modern context. As is more 
fully explained below, this law effectively elevates the duty to 
represent and defend the State and its various entities above all of the 
Attorney General’s other responsibilities.87 It is difficult to see how 
 
 86. Compare Bailey, 353 N.C. at 152, 540 S.E.2d at 320 (discussing that the Attorney 
General provided no source which supported the power to represent “the public interest 
as an entity separate from the State”), with State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Knight, 169 
N.C. 333, 333, 85 S.E. 418, 419 (1915) (listing five questions under consideration, which did 
not include whether or not the Attorney General had standing). 
 87. Section 114-1.1 provides: “The General Assembly reaffirms that the Attorney 
General has had and continues to be vested with those powers of the Attorney General 
that existed at common law, that are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution 
or laws of North Carolina.” N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-1.1 (2017) (emphasis added). By 
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the Attorney General could claim a common law ability to refuse to 
defend the State or its laws or actions, when the General Assembly 
has clearly stated that any such power comes second to the duty to 
defend the State. 
B. Bailey’s Response to Statutory Arguments for a Right Not to 
Defend 
Although the Supreme Court of North Carolina has held the 
common law power to act in the public interest is not distinct from the 
interests of the State, the specific statutory enumeration of a duty to 
act in the public interest in subsection 8(a), wholly separate from the 
duty to represent the State, might suggest the General Assembly 
decided to legislate that division.88 Expansive terminology, such as 
“when he deems it to be advisable” and “all matters affecting the 
public interest,”89 connotes an extensive grant of power from the 
General Assembly that might include refusing to defend the State.90 
The Attorney General attempted to use just such an argument 
when claiming the power to intervene on behalf of the public in 
Bailey. But the court determined the language of this provision was 
not nearly as far-reaching as it appears. It noted that “while 
subsection (8)(a) allows the Attorney General to intervene in 
proceedings when he deems it to be advisable ‘in the public interest,’ 
he may do so only as a representative of ‘the using and consuming 
public.’”91 The court noted that the phrase “using and consuming 
public” has only ever appeared in cases dealing with “utility-related 
goods and services,”92 i.e., in rate-making cases. The court was 
cautious not to interpret this phrasing in a broader way. To support 
such a narrow reading of the statute, the court seems to rely on the 
General Assembly’s intent to limit the Attorney General’s statutory 
power to intervene on behalf of the public interest in proceedings 
involving utility rates.93 As further support for this interpretation, the 
 
vesting the Attorney General with only those powers that are not “repugnant” to the law 
of North Carolina, this statute inherently subordinates the Attorney General’s common 
law powers to those codified in section 114-2, including the duty to defend the State.  
 88. See Morgan, supra note 23, at 171 (“It seems certain that the General Assembly 
intended, by this amendment, to clearly establish the power and duty of the Attorney 
General to represent the public interest quite separate and apart from the existence of any 
such power and duty at common law.”). 
 89. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-2(8)(a) (2017). 
 90. See Morgan, supra note 23, at 170–71. 
 91. Bailey, 353 N.C. at 154, 540 S.E.2d. at 321 (emphasis in original). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. Former Attorney General of North Carolina Lacy Thornburg recognized 
similar limitations on the power of the Attorney General to “protect the public interest.” 
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court notes that the second sentence of subsection 8(a) only allows 
the Attorney General to “institute and originate” a proceeding before 
an agency but does not permit her to intervene in a court of law.94 
Thus, in Bailey, the Supreme Court of North Carolina took a 
literal and narrow view of the language in subsection 8(a). Assuming 
that the court would use the same sort of literal interpretation if 
presented with the question of whether or not the Attorney General 
could refuse to defend state laws, it would likely say no. The court 
insisted that this provision only enables the Attorney General to act 
in situations involving utility-related goods and services, and not to 
act for the public in general. Furthermore, even if this provision was 
more broadly applicable, the court likely would not view it as 
implying the ability to refuse to defend the State or its laws because 
the court also precisely interprets the language regarding the 
situations to which this provision applies. Because the statute directly 
states the Attorney General may “institute or originate” proceedings 
before an “agency,” the court found that it does not grant the 
Attorney General the power to intervene in a suit before a court of 
law.95 Therefore, a court is unlikely to construe this same language as 
granting the power to refuse to defend a state law, an action that 
would deviate from the language in subsection 8(a) even more than 
the actions of the Attorney General in Bailey. 
IV.  OTHER SOURCES OF POWER 
While the common law and statutory duties are the Attorney 
General of North Carolina’s main sources of power, other authorities 
impact whether the Attorney General can refuse to defend. John 
Harris argues the oath of office the Attorney General must take 
pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution weighs in favor of the 
Attorney General’s ability to refuse to defend.96 Others have 
considered the effect oaths of office have on the refusal to defend,97 
but few have yet considered what role the North Carolina Rules of 
 
See Thornburg, supra note 51, at 370–71. Thornburg notes that the office of the Attorney 
General was tasked with the duty “to handle cases and establish policy in areas where, by 
law, responsibility for establishment or enforcement of public policy is placed directly on 
the Attorney General.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. Bailey, 353 N.C. at 154, 540 S.E.2d at 321. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Harris, supra note 59, at 2042–44. 
 97. See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 2110 (rejecting the argument that an 
oath to “support” the Constitution “might compel state executives to decline to defend the 
validity of state laws”). 
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Professional Conduct play in the matter. This section considers both 
in turn. 
A. Oath(s) of Office 
As noted above, Harris argues that the constitutional oath of 
office supports the argument that the Attorney General can refuse to 
defend a state law.98 Harris concludes that the Attorney General’s 
promise to “support and maintain” the Constitutions of the United 
States and North Carolina provides a clear avenue for refusing to 
defend a state law the Attorney General deems unconstitutional.99 
While straightforward enough, others have disagreed with this 
interpretation.100 Devins and Prakash assert that an interpretation like 
Harris’s reads too much into such supportive oaths because it would 
require the Attorney General to become “a purely disinterested 
arbiter of the interplay between state and federal law.”101 This is 
hardly the role of the Attorney General of North Carolina, as his 
enumerated duties clearly require him to represent and defend the 







 98. See Harris, supra note 59, at 2042. The North Carolina Constitution provides that 
all elected or appointed state officials must take the following oath: “I, 
__________________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and maintain the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and the Constitution and laws of North 
Carolina not inconsistent therewith, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of my 
office as ___________________, so help me God.” N.C. CONST. art. VI, §	7. 
 99. See Harris, supra note 59, at 2042–45. A similar argument could be made with 
respect to the oath the federal government requires state officials to take: 
Every member of a State legislature, and every executive and judicial officer of a 
State, shall, before he proceeds to execute the duties of his office, take an oath in 
the following form, to wit: “I, A B, do solemnly swear that I will support the 
Constitution of the United States.”  
4 U.S.C. §	101 (2012).  
 100. See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 2112 (“This oath [of office] does not 
demand that attorneys general decline to defend state law (or concede its invalidity) 
whenever they personally conclude that a state law is unconstitutional .	.	.	. The supportive 
oath never requires attorneys to shed their ordinary role of advancing the interests of their 
states .	.	. and instead only act on the ‘best’ reading of the law.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-2(1)–(2) (2017). 
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Devins and Prakash further note that such an interpretation 
would have far-reaching implications beyond the office of the 
Attorney General. Every single attorney in North Carolina is 
required to take an oath upon receiving a license to practice law103 
which is similar to that required of the Attorney General of North 
Carolina in the state constitution.104 Both require a promise to 
support, maintain, or otherwise defend the Constitution of the United 
States. If these supportive oaths were interpreted in the manner 
Harris suggests—requiring attorneys to play “disinterested arbiter” 
between laws and the Federal and State Constitutions—“[t]housands 
of litigators would be duty-bound to yield arguments .	.	. merely 
because that lawyer personally concludes that the .	.	. statute is 
unconstitutional.”105 “No one,” though, “imagines that such lawyers 
are barred from advancing a viable argument in favor of validity of 
state law merely because that lawyer personally concludes that 
federal law more likely than not trumps the state law in question.”106 
Similarly, it is hard to imagine the Attorney General, who is duty 
bound to defend and represent the State and its agencies, may yield 
representation of the State solely because he subjectively interprets a 
given law as invalid or unconstitutional.107 
Furthermore, interpreting the constitutional oath of office as 
conflicting with the statutory duties of the Attorney General would 
go against the basic rules of statutory interpretation. Assuming that 
the constitutional oath required the Attorney General to refuse to 
defend state laws when she deemed them unconstitutional would 
directly conflict with the statutory duty to defend and represent the 
State in suits to which it is a party. This would assume that the 
General Assembly enacted a requirement for the Attorney General 
to defend state agencies without intending them to operate in 
harmony with the statutory oath. Such an assumption would be 
contrary to the “well-settled principle” that “a statute enacted by the 
 
 103. 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 1C.0103 (2018). 
 104. See N.C. CONST. art. VI, §	7; N.C. STATE BAR, OATH OF OFFICE AS AN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW (2018), https://www.ncbar.gov/media/283884/Oath-of-Office.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YJ39- HG7J].  
 105. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 2, at 2112–13 (emphasis in original). 
 106. See id. at 2113. 
 107. The question might be different if the Attorney General was sure, for example, 
that there was absolutely no “basis in law or fact” for defense of a state law, or that a 
defense would be “frivolous.” N.C. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (N.C. STATE BAR 2017). 
But at least where the Attorney General subjectively believes a state law to be 
unconstitutional, the supportive oath of office is likely not basis enough for refusing to 
defend a state law.  
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General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional.”108 North 
Carolina courts apply this rule by resolving all doubts about a law in 
favor of the law’s constitutionality.109 Therefore, interpreting the oath 
of office as Harris suggests would require foregoing basic statutory 
construction rules in order to imply an option to refuse to defend 
state laws. 
One could argue that the implications of the Attorney General’s 
oath are different from those of other attorneys because the Attorney 
General is an elected official and his responsibilities are somewhat 
unique compared to those of other attorneys. But this interpretation 
would conflict with the duties of the Attorney General of North 
Carolina, in particular, because the General Assembly has formally 
stipulated that, at least in certain situations, the Attorney General’s 
duties to the State are those that any attorney owes to a client.110 
Section 120-32.6 of the General Statutes of North Carolina provides 
that “[w]henever the validity or constitutionality of an act of the 
General Assembly or a provision of the Constitution of North 
Carolina is the subject of any action in any court” the General 
Assembly is “deemed to be a client of the Attorney General for 
purposes of that action as a matter of law.”111 This language invokes 
all of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct that govern 
the relationship between all attorneys and their clients, including 
Rule 1.2, which is specifically mentioned in the statutory duties of the 
Attorney General.112 
B. The North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct 
Although section 120-32.6 only applies in a very specific 
scenario—when the General Assembly is the defendant to a suit 
challenging the constitutionality of one of its acts—that has proven to 
be the most common scenario where the question of a duty to defend 
arises.113 By mandating that the General Assembly is the Attorney 
General’s “client” in these situations, this provision invokes the 
lawyering aspect of the Attorney General’s role and places her duties 
to the State, just like the duties of any attorney to a client, squarely 
 
 108. E.g., Wayne Cty. Citizens Ass’n for Better Tax Control v. Wayne Cty. Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 328 N.C. 24, 29, 399 S.E.2d 311, 314–15 (1991).  
 109. Id. 
 110. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-2(2) (2017) (requiring the Attorney General to 
represent the State and its sub-entities “in conformance with Rule 1.2 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the North Carolina State Bar”). 
 111. Id. §	120-32.6(b) (emphasis added). 
 112. See id. §	114-2(2). 
 113. See Brown, supra note 14; Phillips, supra note 19. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1855 (2018) 
2018] REFUSING TO DEFEND THE LAW 1877 
within the purview of the North Carolina Rules of Professional 
Conduct.114 The General Assembly had already bound the Attorney 
General to Rule 1.2 in section 114-2(2).115 That rule states “a lawyer 
shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”116 The rule 
does go on to allow an attorney to “exercise his or her professional 
judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of the client.”117 
The operative language here is “professional judgment,” meaning the 
Attorney General would likely need a concrete legal reason beyond 
determining the state law at issue is “a national embarrassment”118 or 
that it is “[o]ne of the worst election pieces of legislation in the 
country”119 in order to waive a particular defense of a state law. 
Similarly, the language of the rule expressly allows attorneys to waive 
or fail to assert particular defenses or positions of a client but does 
not specifically mention the ability to refuse to defend the client 
altogether.120 
Other Rules of Professional Conduct suggest that the Attorney 
General lacks the ability to refuse to defend state laws. Rule 1.3 
addresses the diligence with which an attorney is to pursue a matter 
on behalf of a client.121 While a comment to the rule does state that a 
lawyer has “professional discretion”122 regarding the means by which 
a matter may be pursued, it specifically notes that 
lawyers should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite 
opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the 
 
 114. By using the word “client” in section 120-32.6, the General Assembly implied that 
the Rules of Professional Conduct involving the relationship between an attorney and his 
client apply to the Attorney General. See, e.g., N.C. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (N.C. 
STATE BAR 2017) (describing the competence an attorney should exhibit when 
representing a client); id. r. 1.2 (outlining the scope of an attorney’s representation of a 
client and the allocation of authority between a client and lawyer); id. r. 3.2 (describing an 
attorney’s duty to expedite litigation).  
 115. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-2(2) (2017). 
 116. N.C. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) 1 (N.C. STATE BAR 2017). 
 117. Id. r. 1.2(a)(3). 
 118. See Phillips, supra note 19. 
 119. See Brown, supra note 14. 
 120. The absence of language expressly allowing attorneys to refuse to defend their 
clients altogether certainly does not mean they are allowed to refuse to defend their 
clients. See infra text accompanying notes 129–31. But the fact that the drafters of the rule 
specifically provided that attorneys could “waive or fail to assert a right or position,” 
without expressly providing that an attorney could refuse to defend a client altogether, at 
least suggests that the latter course of action is discouraged. 
 121. N.C. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 1 (N.C. STATE BAR 2017). 
 122. Id. cmt. 1 (emphasis added). 
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lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are 
required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer 
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests 
of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s 
behalf.123 
Such language clearly seems to contradict any suggestion that the 
Attorney General can refuse to defend his “client,” the General 
Assembly. There are other Rules that support the same sentiment,124 
and in 2016 the General Assembly at least implied that all of these 
rules are applicable to the Attorney General.125 
The Rules of Professional Conduct do not unequivocally suggest 
that the Attorney General does not have the right to defend. In fact, 
some Rules actually seem to expressly allow the ability to refuse to 
defend. Rule 1.16(b) states that an attorney “may withdraw from 
representing a client” under one of nine enumerated circumstances.126 
For example, subsection (b)(4) allows an attorney to withdraw when 
“the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers 
repugnant, imprudent or contrary to the advice and judgment of the 
lawyer, or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.”127 
Similarly, subsection (b)(8) specifies that an attorney may withdraw 
from a representation if the client “insists upon presenting a claim or 
defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be 
supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law.”128 The permissive “may” in the prefatory 
language indicates that the decision to withdraw would be completely 
within the discretion of an attorney when the circumstances described 
in subsections (b)(4) or (b)(8) arise. Similarly, Rule 3.1 asserts that 
“[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for 
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument 
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”129 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. The Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct states that “[a]s advocate, a 
lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.” Id. 
r. 0.1. Rule 2.1 states that as an advisor, “a lawyer shall exercise independent, professional, 
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering candid advice, the lawyer may refer not 
only to law, but also to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political 
factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.” Id. r. 2.1. 
 125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	120-32.6 (2017). 
 126. See N.C. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (N.C. STATE BAR 2017). 
 127. Id. r. 1.16(b)(4). 
 128. Id. r. 1.16(b)(8). 
 129. Id. r. 3.1. 
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On its face, the language in Rule 1.16(b) appears to indicate that 
the Attorney General could ethically refuse to defend the State when 
she believed subsections (b)(4) or (b)(8) applied. Rule 3.1 also seems 
to indicate that the Attorney General could refuse to defend the 
constitutionality of a state law when she believed there was no basis 
in law or fact to do so. However, the Rules of Professional Conduct 
are promulgated by the North Carolina State Bar and are not 
superior to conflicting statutory law. The drafters of the Rules 
recognized this hierarchy in paragraph two of Rule 0.2, which states 
that “[t]he Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the 
lawyer’s role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating 
to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers, 
and substantive and procedural law in general.”130 While this language 
does not expressly subjugate the Rules to statutory law, it at least 
suggests the drafters understood there are sources other than the 
Rules that must guide lawyers and that they did not intend the Rules 
to conflict with or supersede them. Therefore, it seems unlikely that 
the Attorney General could successfully invoke the permissive 
language in Rule 1.16(b)(4) or (b)(8), or even the mandatory 
obligation in Rule 3.1 to refuse her statutory duty to “defend all 
actions in the appellate division in which the State shall be interested 
or a party.”131 
Rule 0.2 also specifically addresses the unique role of the 
Attorney General and external sources of law that govern his actions. 
Paragraph five asserts that  
[u]nder various legal provisions, including constitutional, 
statutory, and common law, the responsibilities of a 
government lawyer may include authority concerning legal 
matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-
lawyer relationships .	.	.	. Such authority in various respects is 
generally vested in the attorney general .	.	.	. These Rules do not 
abrogate any such authority.”132 
This paragraph addresses the Rules’ relationship to statutes that grant 
the Attorney General authorities not usually given to lawyers. But the 
last sentence of paragraph five, which expressly provides that the 
Rules do not purport to supersede these statutory grants of power, 
could be extended to statutory duties of the Attorney General as well. 
Such an interpretation would further elevate the Attorney General’s 
 
 130. Id. r. 0.2. 
 131. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	114-2(1) (2017). 
 132. N.C. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 0.2 1 (N.C. STATE BAR 2017) (emphasis added). 
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statutory duties above the language in Rules 1.16 and 3.1. There could 
be an argument that the language “these rules do not abrogate such 
authority” was not meant to apply equally to statutory duties as to 
statutory grants of authority, since paragraph two expressly mentions 
authorities and not duties. However, it is difficult to see how the State 
Bar, which is statutorily created,133 would have the power to 
promulgate rules that would preempt a legislatively established duty 
of the Attorney General. Although the State Bar is vested “with the 
authority to regulate the professional conduct of licensed lawyers,”134 
it seems counterintuitive, in light of preceding analysis, that the 
legislature intended the Rules of Professional Conduct to preempt its 
own statutorily mandated duties for the Attorney General. 
Although the Rules of Professional Conduct have been 
overlooked in analyzing the duties of the Attorney General, the law 
of lawyering plays an integral role in governing the Attorney 
General’s duties to his client, the State. These rules would apply to 
the Attorney General in some manner, even if section 120-32.6 did 
not exist. But the existence of that statute makes clear that the Rules 
of Professional Conduct govern the Attorney General when the 
General Assembly is a party to a suit where its laws are being 
constitutionally challenged—at least to the extent the Rules are able 
to work in harmony with the Attorney General’s statutory duties. 
However, because of the inherent hierarchy between statutory law 
and the Rules of Professional Conduct, it is unlikely that any Rule 
contradictory to the Attorney General’s statutory duties could be 
used as a basis to refute that duty. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it seems that the Attorney General of North 
Carolina does not have the power to refuse to defend state laws or 
actions. Numerous sources of overlapping law dating back to the 
common law of colonial times have made this question difficult to 
answer. Despite this complexity, the recent passage of section 114-1.1, 
which establishes the dominance of the Attorney General’s statutory 
duty to defend and represent the State, along with the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina’s very narrow interpretation of the Attorney 
General’s power to act in the public interest, provide a very clear 
answer. Though these sources of law are probably enough on their 
own to squash any claim of a right to refuse to defend, there are other 
 
 133. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	84-15 (2017). 
 134. Id. §	84-23(a). 
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supplementary sources that further clarify the Attorney General’s 
chief duty as defender of the State in lawsuits and other actions. The 
Attorney General’s oath of office and the North Carolina Rules of 
Professional Conduct further imply the Attorney General likely does 
not possess a right to refuse to defend the State at his own discretion. 
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